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Abstract
We consider a policy regime allowing academic institutions to grant
industry the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over invention resulting
from collaborations. If a firm plays an important role in generating an
invention, the researcher offers the IPRs to the firm, as an incentive to
collaborate. However, he retains certain domains where he can exploit
an invention without having to apply for a license. The choice of these
domains involves a tradeoff. In fact, the researcher either induces the
firm’s effort, by assigning a broad field of use, or he ensures that he can
use an invention in other applications, by granting a narrow field of use.
The reverse occurs if it is the researcher who plays an important role in
generating an invention. The main difference, however, is that if effort
were contractible, the firm could reward the researcher for supplying the
first best level of effort, because, unlike the researcher, it is not cash con-
strained. An empirical analysis, based on E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de
Lausanne research contracts, supports the role of broad fields in bolstering
a firm’s effort, when the latter is important for generating an invention.
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Industry Relations
JEL CLASSIFICATION: L26, I23, O31, D81, D86
∗I would like to thank Marie Thursby, Jerry Thursby, Matthew Higgins, Dominique Foray,
Christopher Curran, Emmanuel Dechenaux, Patrick Gaule and Laurent Mieville for very
valuable advice and discussions. I am indebted to Nicola Lacetera for her very useful comments
during the 2008 REER Conference, Atlanta. I also want to thank Michele Cincera, Lorenzo
Zirulia and other participants at the 2007 Torino and ESSID conferences for their feedback.
Views expressed in this paper and any mistakes are those of the author.
1
1 Introduction
Joint industry-academic research is recognized to play a significant role in the
diffusion of knowledge and as a source of new ideas for both industry and
academia.
Survey evidence on European Technology Transfer Offices by Conti and
Gaule´ (2008) shows that out of 212 respondents, 88 consider industry- spon-
sored research income more important than licensing income as an indicator
of success, 87 consider it equally important and only 37 contend that licensing
income is more important than industry-sponsored research income. Similarly,
105 respondents indicated that they spend more time negotiating and managing
research contracts than licenses, 42 spend about the same time and 65 spend
more time on licenses. In the US, exponents from the industry sector (Thomp-
son, 2003, and Johnson, 2007) point to the importance of university-industry
collaboration as a means of transferring technology, as opposed to a business
model in which firms ”buy” from universities inventions entirely conceived in
university laboratories.
An important aspect of industry-sponsored research contracts is the assign-
ment of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over inventions ensuing from the
collaboration between a firm and an academic researcher. In fact, the ex-ante
allocation of property rights impacts the willingness of the parties to partici-
pate in a project and the effort they devote to it. Academic institutions (and
governments if these policies are established at a national level) face a trade-off.
On the one hand, assigning the IPRs to a firm is an incentive for the latter
to participate in a joint project and fosters the effort it devotes to the project.
On the other, retaining the IPRs allows inventions to be used in applications
with firms other than that participating in the project, without having to pay
a license fee.
In some European countries, such as Sweden and Italy, it is the academic
researcher who decides whether to allow firms to retain IPRs over inventions
derived from joint collaborations. Others, like Switzerland, leave it up to their
academic institutions to choose whether or not the IPRs should be assigned to
industry. The situation in the US is different, as universities retain property
rights generated from federally funded research.
This study examines a policy regime that allows academic institutions to
assign to industry the IPRs deriving from joint collaboration. We distinguish
two cases. One in which the firm’s effort is more important than the researcher’s
effort for generating an invention. In this case the IPRs are assigned to the firm
and the researcher has to decide the breadth of the field of use in which the
industry partner can exercise its rights. The other case is exactly the opposite
- the researcher’s effort is more important than the firm’s effort for the success
of a project. The IPRs are therefore assigned to the researcher and the firm
has to decide the breadth of the field of use in which the researcher can exercise
2
his rights. In the model there is no conflict of interest between the researcher
and his academic institution and, thus, it does not matter whether the IPRs are
assigned to the researcher or the academic institution.
We believe this work provides useful insights for those countries and aca-
demic institutions that have a similar policy in place. Moreover, it explores
an interesting alternative to the US university technology transfer model, as
shaped by the Bayh-Dole Act. Recently, some industry sector professionals in
the US have raised the concern that American universities might have assumed
too rigid a position, especially when managing intellectual property (IP) gener-
ated from industry-sponsored research (Thompson, 2003, and Johnson, 2007).
Interestingly, Thompson contends that European universities are more success-
ful at encouraging university-industry research because they have more flexible
IP policies and in general offer more favorable terms to their industry partners.
In a joint collaboration where the firm’s contribution is decisive in generating
an invention, the researcher offers the IPRs to the firm as an incentive for the
latter to participate in the project.
We find that the researcher grants a broad field of use if the return the firm
earns from the extra fields it is assigned is high. In fact, a high return induces
the firm to make a greater effort, which in turn has a positive impact on the
probability of an invention being generated. The drawback of this choice is
that the researcher cannot apply for a license to use an invention in these fields
because he is cash constrained. When the return the researcher could earn in
these fields compensates for the lower probability of an invention being realized,
the researcher should assign a narrow field of use to the firm.
This case corresponds to types of collaboration that are closer to the market
than to the researcher’s laboratory.
When the researcher’s effort is determinant for the success of a project, the
firm will renounce ownership of the intellectual property rights, which will be
assigned to the researcher. In fact, the latter requires ownership of the IPRs
as a condition to participate in the project. The firm’s choice regarding the
field of use is symmetrical to that the researcher makes when the firm’s effort is
important for generating an invention.
The main difference in relation to the previous case is that if the researcher’s
effort were contractible, the firm could offer a contract stating that the re-
searcher should provide the first best level of effort, in exchange for a compen-
sation that allows the latter to break even. This contract is feasible because the
firm, unlike the researcher, is not cash constrained. However, it is optimal only
if the payoff earned by the firm is not lower than the payoff it would receive if
the researcher did not supply the first best level of effort.
This case corresponds to types of collaboration that are closer to the re-
searcher’s laboratory than to the market.
Empirical evidence based on a sample of industry-sponsored research con-
tracts concluded by researchers at the E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne
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(EPFL)1, provides some support for the case of the firm’s effort being determi-
nant for the success of a project. The contracts we chose govern collaborations
between academic researchers and industry on very applied projects, where the
firm’s effort is likely to be more important. The empirical findings show that
there is a positive relationship between the breadth of the field of use and the
effort supplied by the firm. The result is consistent with the idea, suggested
by the theoretical model, that the researcher can foster the firm’s effort by as-
signing a broad field of use, when the firm’s participation is important for the
success of the project.
Our analysis contributes to the debate on the conditions under which firms
should be assigned the IPRs over inventions generated by university-industry
collaborations (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Moreover, by highlighting the disad-
vantages of assigning a firm a broad field of use, our analysis also contributes
to the theory of hold-ups (Klein at al. 1978, Hart and Moore 1988, Green and
Scotchmer 1995, Ziedonis 2004). For our definition of university-industry col-
laboration we take inspiration from Jensen et al. (2003), Lacetera (2006) and
from the notion of ”research push” adopted by Callaert et al. (2006). Our
assumption of a cash constrained researcher very much resembles that of a cash
constrained research unit made by Aghion and Tirole (1994). Similarly to these
authors, we find that the existence of a cash constraint on the researcher may
cause inefficiency. However, in our model the inefficiency derives from the fact
that the researcher may refrain from assigning a broad field of use to foster the
firm’s effort because he cannot afford a license to use the invention in other
projects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a model analyzing the
choice an academic researcher makes regarding the field of use when deciding to
involve a firm in a project and offering the IPRs to the latter. The underlying
assumption is that the firm’s effort is determinant for the realization of an
invention. Section 3 analyzes the opposite case in which a firm has to choose
regarding the field of use when deciding to involve a researcher in a project and
offering the IPRs to the latter. We assume that the researcher’s contribution is
determinant for the realization of an invention. Section 4 presents the empirical
findings based on a sample of EPFL research contracts. Section 5 concludes.
1EPFL is one of Europe’s leading institutions in the fields of science and technology and is
the world’s 18th university in the field of ”Engineering/Technology and Computer Sciences”
according to the 2008 academic ranking of world universities by Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
4
2 Model with firm contributing more than re-
searcher to an innovation
2.1 Model setup
A researcher asks a firm to collaborate in a research project and offers a con-
tract. The firm is required to provide financial means as well as expertise and
instrumentation. For the moment, we assume that the contribution made to
the project by the firm is more important for generating an invention than that
made by the researcher. This is the case with more applied projects that are
closer to the market than to the researcher’s laboratory.
The contract also contains a definition of the intellectual property rights
regime. We assume that the firm stipulates the ownership of the IPRs as a
condition for participating in a project. This is justified on the grounds that
the firm’s intervention is important for the success of the project.
The benefit of being assigned the IPRs lies in the possibility of making ex-
post ”decisions that were not contracted ex-ante” (Baker et al., 2002). In fact,
by granting the IPRs to the firm, the researcher relinquishes his control over
the use the firm makes of any invention generated during the project.
The researcher, however, wants to make sure he will be able to use the
invention in other projects with commercial value, without having to apply to
the firm for a license. This is in fact the return he expects from the collaboration.
Therefore, if an invention can be exploited in a number of different fields, the
researcher will retain at least some of them. The question is how to split the
fields of use between the researcher and the firm.
In the model, we rule out the possibility that the decision regarding the field
of use is entirely made ex-post, once an invention has been generated. In reality,
because the IPRs are assigned ex-ante to the firm, its ex-post bargaining power
will be so high that the researcher will find it difficult to restrict the domain
within which the firm can exercise its rights.
There are n fields of use in which an invention can be marketed. These
fields can be exploited either by the firm or by the researcher, but they cannot
be exploited by both parties at the same time. In each field, an invention yields
a return, Ri, if exploited by the firm, and a return, Vi, if exploited by the
researcher.
The researcher assigns k − j fields (with k > j) to the firm, because the
latter requires them, together with the IPRs, as a condition for participating
in the project. These fields constitute a natural complement to the IPRs and
without them the firm would not earn any return. The researcher retains n− k
fields that represent the compensation for the effort he devotes to the project.
Finally, he makes a decision concerning the remaining j fields based on whether
he derives greater utility from exploiting them or from assigning them to the
firm and thus inducing it to make a greater effort. Although both the researcher
5
and the firm would realize a positive return on these fields, it is not clear ex-
ante which party makes the highest return. In fact, an exogenous event may
occur during the course of the project that affects the characteristics of the
invention being produced. This, in turn, has an impact on the parties’ returns,
including those from the j fields. We assume that such an event can occur with
a positive probability. However, at the end of the project the characteristics of
the invention are revealed and the parties discover the return they can earn by
exploiting the j fields.
During the development phase, an invention is realized with a positive prob-
ability, p(e, I). We assume that this probability is strictly concave and increases
with the levels of effort supplied by the researcher (e) and the firm (I)2. How-
ever, the impact of the firm’s effort on the probability of an invention being
generated is greater than the impact of the researcher’s effort.
Without loss of insight we assume that the researcher will devote a fixed
amount of effort to the project, e. This amount is no greater than the residual
effort after he has accomplished his two main academic tasks of teaching and
conducting basic research. On the contrary, the effort provided by the firm, I,
varies with expected returns. The assumption regarding e allows us to focus on
the researcher’s role in spurring the firm’s effort by choosing the appropriate
breadth for the field of use. Relaxing this assumption would not significantly
impact the results of the model.
The levels of efforts e and I are not contractible. However, even if I were con-
tractible, the academic researcher could not compensate the firm for supplying
the first best level of effort, because he is cash constrained.
Throughout the model we make the assumption that there is no conflict
of interest between an academic institution and its researcher. This implies
that the academic institution and the researcher represent a sole partner during
negotiations with industry.
The interaction between the academic researcher and the firm is extended
over six stages:
1. The researcher asks a firm to collaborate in an applied project. He offers
a contract assigning the IPRs to the firm and defining a regime for the
fields of use.
2. The firm may accept or decline the offer. If it accepts, both the researcher
and the firm will invest in effort.
3. An invention occurs with a positive probability.
4. The uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the invention is revealed
and the parties discover the returns they could derive from the j fields.
2e and I are measured in dollars.
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5. The firm exploits the invention in the fields assigned to it, and the re-
searcher does so in the remaining fields.
6. Payoffs are realized.
2.2 The first best
In this section, we merge the two entities (the researcher and the firm) and
find the levels of effort that maximize the sum of their payoffs. In line with
the standard approach in contract theory, we will define this case as our first
best. In each field, if Ri ≥ Vi, the firm will exploit the invention; conversely, if
Vi ≥ Ri, the researcher will do so.
The ex ante payoff of the merged entity is:
V FB = p(e, I) ∗ [
n∑
i=1
max(Ri, Vi)]− e− I
The researcher devotes a fixed level of effort to the project, e. The firm
however chooses a level of effort, I∗FB , that maximizes V FB. In our first best,
it does not matter how the n fields are assigned. In fact, the firm and the
researcher are a sole entity and there is no need for the researcher to utilize the
j fields as a lever to foster the firm’s effort.
2.3 The case of no uncertainty
We depict this case as a situation in which the parties do not encounter any
uncertainty regarding the value they could derive by exploiting an invention
in the j fields. This is a benchmark case against which a situation involving
uncertainty will be assessed.
Payoffs When the researcher retains n− k + j fields, his payoff is:
UN = p(e, I) ∗
n∑
i=k−j+1
Vi − e
The firm’s payoff, when exploiting the remaining k − j fields, is:
ΠN = p(e, I) ∗
k−j∑
i=1
Ri − I
When the researcher renounces the j fields and assigns them to the firm, he
requires a compensation, T . Therefore, his payoff is:
UB + T
where: UB = p(e, I) ∗
∑n
i=k+1 Vi − e.
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The firm’s payoff is:
ΠB − T
where: ΠB = p(e, I) ∗
∑k
i=1Ri − I.
Whether the firm is assigned k − j or k fields, it will choose a level of effort
that maximizes its expected payoffs. Moreover, we assume that:
[p(e, I(
k∑
i=1
Ri))− p(e, I(
k−j∑
i=1
Ri))] ∗
k∑
i=1
Ri ≥ I(
k∑
i=1
Ri)− I(
k−j∑
i=1
Ri) (1)
This assumption guarantees that the firm, if assigned the j fields, will find
it profitable to provide a level of effort I(
∑k
i=1Ri) ≥ I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri).
Researcher’s decision concerning the allocation of the fields of use
When deciding about the fields of use, the researcher will adopt the following
rules:
1. Allocate k − j fields to the firm;
2. Retain n− k fields;
3. Assign the j fields to the firm if:
ΠB −ΠN ≥ UN − UB (2)
Otherwise, retain the j fields.
Condition (2) in rule 3 is the result of a bargaining game between the re-
searcher and the firm. The researcher is willing to give up the j fields if the
upfront payment, T , he receives is at least equal to UN−UB . The firm is willing
to accept the j fields if the payment it has to make is no greater than ΠB−ΠN .
Combining the two conditions, we obtain that the j fields are assigned to the
firm if ΠB −ΠN ≥ UN − UB .
From condition (1) we derive that ΠB−ΠN ≥ 0. This implies that UB−UN ≥
0 is sufficient for an agreement to be reached assigning the j fields to the firm.
The upfront fee, T , the firm has to pay to acquire the j fields has no effect
on its expected returns and on the effort it furnishes. Therefore, if assigned the
j fields, the firm will furnish a greater effort, because its expected returns are
higher.
If
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri−Vi) < 0, the researcher may still find it profitable to assign
the j fields to the firm, provided that the gain in terms of a greater probability
of an invention being generated outweighs the loss
∑k
i=k−j+1 Vi incurred from
relinquishing the j fields.
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Similarly, if
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri − Vi) ≥ 0, the researcher may find it profitable
to maintain the j fields if the value he would derive compensates for the loss in
terms of a lower probability of an invention being generated.
Regardless of which partner is assigned the j fields, the probability of an
invention being generated is lower than in the first best. In fact, the firm
chooses a level of effort that maximizes its own payoff and not the sum of the
payoffs of the merged entity.
2.4 The case of uncertainty
We now analyze a situation in which the parties are uncertain regarding the
returns they will be able to generate by exploiting the j fields.
When deciding on the field of use, the researcher has two options. First, he
can assign a broad field of use, which encompasses all k fields. In this way, the
firm can earn a higher return and provide a greater effort than if it were assigned
only k − j fields. This, in turn, has a positive impact on the probability of an
invention being generated. The drawback is that the researcher renounces the
possibility of making a return from the j fields. Therefore, as compensation, he
asks the firm to pay an upfront fee that extracts the expected surplus, EΠB −
ΠN , that the firm derives from the j fields 3. Thus, the researcher’s payoff is
EUB + T and the firm’s payoff is EΠB − T . T is the payment the researcher
requires for assigning the additional j fields. EUB and EΠB are expected values
since the researcher and the firm do not know with certainty the returns they
can realize from the j fields.
In the model, since the researcher is cash constrained, when he renounces
the j fields he cannot apply for a license ex-post if he learns that
∑k
i=k−j+1(Vi−
Ri) ≥ 0.
As a second option, the researcher can assign a narrow field of use. There-
fore, he allocates only the k − j fields that the firm requires as a condition for
participating in the project and retains the remaining n − k + j fields. If, ex-
post, the parties realize that
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri − Vi) ≥ 0, the firm will pay a fee to
the researcher to exploit the j field. Because the fee is paid ex-post, it impacts
the expected returns of the firm and, thus, its decision regarding the amount of
effort to provide. To prevent the researcher from assigning the j fields ex-post
to another partner generating the same returns as the firm, the latter requires
that the contract should include a clause stating that if
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri−Vi) ≥ 0,
the researcher assigns the j fields to the firm.
We assume that the event
∑k
i=k−j+1(Vi−Ri) ≥ 0 occurs with a probability
d, while the event
∑k
i=k−j+1(Vi −Ri) < 0 occurs with a probability 1− d.
The researcher’s ex-ante payoff when he assigns a narrow field of use is4:
3E designates expected value because the firm does not know with certainty the return it
can make from the j fields.
4We designate the researcher’s payoff with UNU where the subscript stands for narrow
in the case of uncertainty. E represents expected value. In fact, the researcher is uncertain
regarding the value he can derive from the j fields.
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UNU = p(e, I) ∗ [
n∑
i=k+1
Vi + d ∗
k∑
i=k−j+1
EVi + (1− d) ∗ EM ]− e
With a probability d, the researcher will exploit the j fields, while with
probability 1− d he will assign them to the firm in exchange for a payment M .
The firm’s ex-ante payoff is:
ΠNU = p(e, I) ∗ [
k−j∑
i=1
Ri + (1− d) ∗
k∑
i=k−j+1
(ERi − EM)]− I
If the firm is assigned a narrow field of use, it estimates ex-ante that it will
be able to exploit the j fields with a probability 1 − d. Therefore, its payoff
includes the expectation that with a probability 1 − d it will realize a value∑k
i=k−j+1Ri in exchange for a payment, M , to the researcher. This in turn has
an impact on the level of effort the firm provides.
Ex-post, the researcher will require the payment, M , to extract all the firm’s
surplus. Therefore, M∗ =
∑k
i=k−j+1Ri. This is possible because the researcher
has a greater bargaining power deriving from the retention of the j fields.
Proposition 1 The researcher will assign a broad fields of use to the firm if
d ≤ d.
d is equal to:
[p(e, I(
∑k
i=1ERi))− p(e, I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri))] ∗ (
∑n
i=k+1 Vi +
∑k
i=1ERi)
p(e, I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri)) ∗ [
∑k
i=k−j+1(EVi − ERi)]
−
− [I(
∑k
i=1ERi)− I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri)]
p(e, I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri)) ∗ [
∑k
i=k−j+1(EVi − ERi)]
(3)
Proof. The researcher assigns a broad field of use if UB + T ≥ UNU .
Substituting:
UB with p(e, I(
∑k
i=1ERi)) ∗
∑n
i=k+1 Vi − e;
T ∗ with p(e, I(
∑k
i=1ERi)) ∗
∑k
i=1ERi− I(
∑k
i=1ERi)− [p(e, I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri)) ∗∑k−j
i=1 Ri − I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri)];
UNU with p(e, I(
∑k−j
i=1 Ri))∗[
∑n
i=k+1 Vi+d∗
∑k
i=k−j+1EVi+(1−d)∗EM ]−e;
M∗ with
∑k
i=k−j+1Ri;
and solving for d, we obtain the condition above.
The probability of an invention being generated affects the value a researcher
can derive from all the fields he retains. Therefore, if, by renouncing the j fields,
the researcher obtains in exchange a significant increase in the probability of an
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invention being generated, then he will assign a broad field of use. The range
of parameters for which this choice is optimal increases in
∑k
i=k−j+1ERi and
decreases in
∑k
i=k−j+1EVi.
We have assumed that the researcher and the firm do not incur any verifi-
cation cost to discover ex-post whether
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri − Vi) ≥ 0 or vice versa.
However, in reality these costs are positive and may reduce the range of param-
eters over which a narrow field of use is optimal.
3 Model with researcher contributing more than
firm to an innovation
3.1 Model setup
This case is symmetrical to the one we considered in the previous section. A
firm is willing to collaborate with a researcher in a research project and offers
a contract. The contribution made by the researcher to the project is more
important for generating an invention than that made by the firm. This is
indeed true for more basic research projects that are closer to the researcher’s
laboratory than to the market.
The contract the firm offers to the researcher contains a definition of the IPR
regime. The researcher stipulates ownership of the intellectual property rights
as a condition for participating in the project. Since we made the assumption
that the researcher and his academic institution are a sole partner, it does
not matter whether the IPRs are assigned to the researcher or the academic
institution. The firm, however, has to make sure that it can retain at least some
of the fields in which the invention can be marketed. Thus, it will assign to the
researcher the n−k fields stipulated by the latter as a condition for participating
in the project; it will retain k − j fields and make a decision on the remaining
j fields, depending on whether it derives greater utility by exploiting them or
by assigning them to the researcher and thus inducing greater effort from the
latter.
Again the parties are uncertain as to the returns they could make by ex-
ploiting the j fields.
The impact of the researcher’s effort on the probability of an invention being
generated is greater than the impact of the firm’s effort. Without loss of insight
we assume that the firm will supply to the project a fixed amount of effort
I. The effort provided by the researcher, e, however varies according to the
expected returns. In any case, it cannot be greater than the residual effort after
the researcher has accomplished his two main academic tasks of teaching and
conducting basic research.
11
The main difference in relation to the setup in the previous section is that
the firm is not cash constrained. Therefore, if the researcher’s effort were con-
tractible, the firm could offer the researcher an ex-ante compensation for pro-
viding the first best level of effort.
3.2 The first best
As before, we merge the two entities (researcher and firm) and find the levels of
effort that maximize the sum of their payoffs. In each field, if Ri − Vi ≥ 0, the
firm will exploit the invention; otherwise the researcher will do so.
The ex-ante payoff of the merged entity is:
V FB = p(e, I) ∗ [
n∑
i=1
max(Ri, Vi)]− e− I
The researcher provides a level of effort, e∗FB that maximizes V FB. Con-
versely, the firm chooses a fixed level of effort, I.
3.3 The case of no uncertainty
In the absence of any uncertainty regarding the returns the firm and the re-
searcher can derive from the fields j, the firm will assign the latter to the re-
searcher if:
[p(I, e(
n∑
i=k−j+1
Vi))− p(I, e(
n∑
i=k+1
Vi))] ∗
k−j∑
i=1
Ri ≥ p(I, e(
n∑
i=k+1
Vi)) ∗
k∑
i=1
Ri (4)
Because the researcher is cash constrained, he does not pay any fee to the
firm in exchange for the j fields.
This option is optimal for the firm if the surplus it realizes from the remaining
k− j fields compensates for the loss incurred from relinquishing the j fields. We
assume the following condition:
[p(I, e(
n∑
i=k−j+1
Vi))− p(I, e(
n∑
i=k+1
Vi))] ∗
n∑
i=k−j+1
Vi ≥ e(
n∑
i=k−j+1
Vi)− e(
n∑
i=k+1
Vi)
Therefore, if assigned the j fields, the researcher will supply the level of effort
e(
∑n
i=k−j+1 Vi), with e(
∑n
i=k−j+1 Vi) > e(
∑n
i=k+1 Vi).
If the researcher’s effort were contractible, the firm could offer a contract
to the researcher stating that the researcher should supply the first best level
of effort in exchange for an upfront transfer, A. The researcher will accept the
offer if the payment, A, suffices for him to break even. In the same contract the
firm will assign the j fields to the researcher if the
∑k
i=k−j+1 Vi ≥
∑k
i=k−j+1Ri.
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A contract requiring the researcher to provide the first best level of effort is
optimal for the firm if the payoff it obtains is not lower than the payoff it would
receive if the researcher did not supply the first best level of effort.
3.4 The case of uncertainty
When there is uncertainty regarding the returns that either party can derive
from the j fields, the firm has the choice between assigning a narrow field of use
to the researcher, i.e. the n− k fields, or granting a broad field of use, i.e. the
n− k + j fields.
If the researcher is assigned a narrow field of use, he cannot pay an ex-post
fee to obtain the j fields because he is cash constrained. Conversely, if he is
assigned a broad field of use, the firm can, ex-post, acquire the fields j and pay
him a fee that is at least equal to the researcher’s forgone return. The firm will
seek to acquire these fields provided that
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri − Vi) ≥ 0.
Once again, to prevent the researcher from assigning, ex-post, the j fields to
another partner generating the same returns as the firm, the latter includes in
the contract a clause stating that if
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri − Vi) ≥ 0, the researcher will
assign the j fields to the firm.
Similarly to what we have seen above, the firm’s choice between a narrow and
a broad field of use depends on the expectation that, ex-post,
∑k
i=k−j+1(Ri −
Vi) ≥ 0 or vice versa. Therefore, the higher the probability, d, of the return the
researcher realizes from the j fields being greater than that which the firm can
derive, the more the firm will tend to assign a broad field of use.
Moreover this choice is convenient when the difference between the proba-
bility of an invention being generated if the researcher is assigned the j fields
and if he is not is high.
If the researcher’s effort were contractible, the firm could offer a contract to
the researcher with a compensation for supplying the first best level of effort.
The researcher would accept if the compensation sufficed for him to break even.
The same contract will assign the j fields to the researcher if EVi ≥ ERi.
Again, requiring that the researcher provides the first best level of effort is
optimal for the firm if the payoff it obtains is not lower than the payoff it would
receive if the researcher did not supply the first best level of effort.
4 Empirical test of the importance of the breadth
of the field of use
In this section we present some empirical evidence of the importance of the
field of use based on a sample of research contracts negotiated by academic
researchers at the E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL). EPFL
technology transfer policy prescribes that when a researcher collaborates with
a firm and an invention results, the firm has the priority right to file a patent
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application(s) in its name and at its cost. The firm then grants a license to
the researcher with a right to sub-license outside the domain reserved to the
firm. For inventions that are generated principally in university laboratories,
the IPRs are usually assigned to EPFL. Licensing contracts are then negotiated
with firms to commercialize these inventions.
Discussions with technology transfer professionals at EPFL revealed impor-
tant insights into why firms push to retain the IPRs ensuing from university-
industry collaborations. According to them, firms perceive the assignment of
the IPRs as ”fair compensation” for their effort in a research project. Moreover,
when the IPRs are assigned to them, firms can control the process of writing
and filing patents. Also, most firms believe that when a patent is assigned
to them, the underlying invention receives better protection than if the patent
were assigned to the university. Finally, ownership of IPRs allows firms ”to
make decisions ex-post that were not contracted ex-ante” (Baker at al., 2004).
While firms find it profitable to own IPRs over university-industry inven-
tions, the consensus among EPFL professors is divided. We interviewed a num-
ber of EPFL professors to discover the pros and cons of a policy that assigns
to industry the IPRs derived from joint collaboration. Some of them contended
that assigning the IPRs to a firm acts as an incentive for the latter to mar-
ket university research results. Moreover, it is a way of reducing the time and
financial resources required to file a patent and the transaction costs arising
from the management of joint intellectual property. However, a few professors
expressed some concerns with regard to this policy. In particular, one professor
cited a case in which a firm retained the IPRs over the research results derived
from a collaboration and did not commercialize the invention. The professor
applied for a license to found a startup that would commercialize the inven-
tion but the firm refused. Another claimed that assigning the IPRs to firms
prevents a researcher from conducting further research in a field close to the
field of use assigned to the firm. In fact once the IPRs are assigned to a firm
in a pre-defined domain, the firm not only acquires an asset in the form of the
ownership rights over the invention but also a dominant position in negotiations
with the researcher. Therefore, it becomes more difficult for the researcher to
prove that the type of applied research he conducts, although it may be close
to it, does not impinge on the field of use of the firm. This in turn discourages
the researcher from pursuing further research in domains that are adjacent to
the field of use granted to the firm.
The contracts in our sample belong to a special category. For a given amount
of effort supplied by the firm, the federal government offers to pay for the ef-
fort supplied by the academic researcher. This subsidy is generally granted for
projects involving small to medium-sized Swiss firms (or subsidiaries of multina-
tional companies based in Switzerland), as a means of promoting local economic
development5. The nature of the projects involved is usually very applied. The
5In our sample firms with fewer than 50 employees constitute 55% of the total.
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federal authorities select them on the basis of detailed business plans and require
the firms to market any result ensuing from the collaboration with academic re-
searchers. This case very much resembles the one analyzed in the model where
the firm’s effort is more important than the researcher’s effort for the success of
a project.
We examined 152 contracts signed during the period 2000-2008. Each con-
tains a precise definition of the field of use in which the firm will exercise its
property rights. Moreover, it includes a specification of the money value of the
effort devoted to the project by the firm. As we have seen in the theoretical
model, when a researcher is cash constrained, there is no difference between a
contractible and non-contractible effort by the firm. In fact, even if the effort
were contractible, the researcher could not reward the firm with a cash transfer
for supplying the first best level of effort. Thus, the researcher will have to
foster the firm’s effort by choosing the correct breadth for the field of use.
4.1 Econometric model
Our dependent variable is the effort supplied by the firm to a joint collaboration.
We model the firm’s effort (INDUSTRY E) as a function of the breadth of the
field of use and other controls.
The specification of the model is a two-equation recursive system. In the
first equation we analyze the factors affecting the breadth of the field of use
(USE BR). Specifically, we need to measure the impact of the expected returns,
the firm derives from the project, on the breadth of the field of use. In fact, as
we have seen from the model, the researcher assigns a broad field of use to the
firm if the returns the latter can make are high. We proxy the firm’s expected
returns with a variable capturing the scope of the project (PROJECT SCOPE).
The underlying logic is that if a project concerns the development of a large
number of the components of the final product being commercialized, the firm
will derive a high value from the project. Conversely, if the project concerns
the development of a small part of the final product being commercialized, the
value the firm derives from the project is most likely to be low.
We measure the breadth of the field of use by an index capturing the num-
ber of industry sectors in which a product can be marketed. This index ranges
from 1 (narrowest) to 4 (broadest)6. Its distribution is shown in the appendix.
An example of a narrow field of use would be ”gas sensors for medical applica-
tions” since this field allows commercial applications in the medical sector only.
Conversely, ”polymer reaction engineering” is an example of a broad field of use
since it allows applications in a greater number of industry sectors. Our measure
for the scope of the project is an index ranging once again from 1 (narrowest)
to 4 (broadest). An example of a broad scope would be ”power-electronic gear
boxes for turbogenerators” in relation to a project on power generation, whereas
6The analyses concerning the breadth of the field of use and the scope of the project were
conducted with the help of a PhD student in civil engineering at the Georgia Institute of
Technology, Atlanta, US
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an example of a narrow scope is ”magnetic oscillator” in relation to a project
on watch construction.
We control for whether the industry partner is a startup (STARTUP), the
year of foundation of the firm (FOUNDATION), and the size of the firm mea-
sured by the number of its employees. We classified the sample of firms according
to the following size categories: 1-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1000 and >1000. For
each of these categories we built a corresponding dummy7.
Moreover, we control for whether the academic researcher is cash constrained
with a variable GRANT that measures the amount of grant money received by
the researcher in the five years preceding the conclusion of the contract8.
With the variable DURATION we control for the duration of a research
contract. Finally, we include in our regressions field fixed effects (basic science,
small-scale engineering, large-scale engineering, computer science, biotechnol-
ogy) and year fixed effects.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
INDUSTRY E 1.41 0.61 0 3.34 152
USE BR 2.32 1.22 1 4 152
PROJECT SCOPE 2.3 1.21 1 4 152
STARTUP 0.16 0.37 0 1 152
DURATION 24.26 10.26 6 68 152
FOUNDATION 1971.57 43.31 1793 2007 152
GRANT 6.5 3.56 0 10.49 152
D 50 0.55 0.5 0 1 152
D 100 0.08 0.27 0 1 152
D 1000 0.05 0.22 0 1 152
D 1000 PLUS 0.12 0.32 0 1 152
Results
Figure 2 shows the results of the regression. In the first column we present
a simple OLS regression of INDUSTRY E over USE BR and other controls. As
predicted by our model, the coefficient on USE BR is positive and significant
at the 1% significant level. The coefficient is robust to various combinations of
the controls.
In the second and third columns we present our two-equation system. We
use two-stage least squares with robust standard errors. In the first stage we
regress USE BR on PROJECT SCOPE and controls. In the second stage we
regress INDUSTRY E on the estimated value of USE BR and controls. We
7The dummies are: D 50, D 100, D 500, D 1000, D 1000 PLUS.
8INDUSTRY EFFORT and GRANT were measured in Swiss Francs and converted into
real terms by dividing for the consumer price index available for the years in which the
contracts were signed. Both variables are expressed in log.
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avoid using nonlinear specifications in the first stage such as ordered logit or
probit because the second stage estimations would not be consistent unless the
functional form in the first stage were exactly right (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
In the first stage, the coefficient on PROJECT SCOPE is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1% level. This suggests that the greater the scope of the project,
the higher the firm’s expected return from using the project’s result and, thus,
the greater the rationale for a broad field of use. In the second stage, the co-
efficient on USE BR is positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming our
model prediction. The coefficient for GRANT is positive and significant at the
10% level. This suggests that less cash constrained academic researchers may
be more willing to assign a broad field of use because they have less difficulty
in paying for a license later on. The coefficient for DURATION is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Thus, the greater the length of a project, the greater
the effort supplied by the firm. The coefficients for STARTUP, D 50 and D 1000
are all positive and significant, indicating a positive relationship between effort
and either small or large firms.
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Table 2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES INDUSTRY E USE BR INDUSTRY E
USE BR 0.10a 0.26a
[0.03] [0.10]
STARTUP 0.36b 0.07 0.37a
[0.14] [0.28] [0.14]
DURATION 0.02a 0.00 0.02a
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
FOUNDATION -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
LGRANT 0.03b 0.01 0.02c
[0.01] [0.03] [0.01]
D 50 0.21c -0.49 0.27b
[0.12] [0.29] [0.13]
D 100 -0.15 -0.23 -0.13
[0.22] [0.39] [0.21]
D 1000 0.41c -0.99 0.50b
[0.23] [0.62] [0.23]
D 1000 PLUS 0.12 -0.37 0.18
[0.16] [0.35] [0.16]
PROJECT SCOPE 0.39a
[0.08]
Constant 3.18 6.82 2.16
[2.64] [5.06] [2.52]
FIELD FE YES YES YES
TIME FE YES YES YES
Observations 152 152 152
R2 0.337 0.283 0.258
a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
5 Concluding Remarks
The phenomenon of university-industry technology transfer has been widely
studied with special attention to the US model according to which universities
retain the IPRs derived from federally funded research.
This study adopts a different perspective and examines a policy regime al-
lowing firms to retain the IPRs over inventions generated from collaboration
with academia. This is often the case in European academic institutions when
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the contribution a firm makes to a project is more important than that of the
researcher.
When the firm’s participation is determinant for generating an invention,
the researcher will offer the ownership of the intellectual property rights to the
firm as a lever to induce the latter to collaborate in a project. However, he
will retain some domains where he can exploit an invention without having
to apply to the firm for a license. Our analysis reveals that the researcher’s
choice regarding which domains should be retained results from solving a trade-
off between inducing the firm’s effort, by assigning a broad field of use, and
using the project’s results in the largest number of applications, by granting
a narrow field of use. If the expected returns the firm can realize from the
extra domains assigned to it are high, then a broad field of use is the optimal
choice. In fact, higher expected returns translate into greater effort by the firm
and, therefore, into a higher probability of an invention being generated. On
the other hand, when the value the researcher can derive from these domains
is sufficiently high to compensate for a lower probability of an invention being
realized, then assigning a narrow field of use is optimal.
This case is consistent with collaborations on more applied projects that are
closer to the market that to the researcher’s laboratory.
When the researcher’s effort is determinant for the success of a project, the
firm will renounce ownership of the intellectual property rights, which will be
assigned to the researcher. In our model there is no conflict of interest between
the researcher and his academic institution and, therefore, it does not matter
whether the IPRs are assigned to the researcher or the academic institution.
The choice the firm makes regarding the field of use is symmetrical to the one
the researcher has to make when the firm’s effort is determinant for the success
of a project. However, if the firm assigns a broad field of use it can apply for a
license ex-post, because, unlike the researcher, it is not cash constrained.
Moreover, if effort were contractible, the firm could offer a contract to the
researcher stating that the researcher should provide the first best level of effort
in exchange for upfront compensation. This contract is feasible because the firm
is not cash constrained. However, it is optimal only if the payoff the firm earns
is not lower than the payoff it would receive if the researcher did not supply the
first best level of effort.
This case is consistent with collaborations on basic applied projects that are
closer to the researcher’s laboratory than to the market.
We provided some empirical evidence for the case of the firm’s effort being
more important than the researcher’s effort for the success of a project. The
results indicate a positive relationship between the breadth of the field of use
and the effort supplied by a firm.
Our study highlights the importance of carefully defining ex-ante the field
of use in which a partner will exercise its property rights. Survey evidence from
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Cockburn (2007) shows that one of the most frequent motivations for want-
ing to restructure license deals among license partners lies in an inappropriate
definition of field of use restrictions. We believe that partners definitely experi-
ence greater remorse in the case of research collaborations, where negotiations
concerning field of use take place before an invention is generated. Moreover,
remorse is likely to affect parties, such as academic researchers, who, on the one
hand, are often cash constrained and, on the other, have the potential to use
the results of a project in several other applications.
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6 Appendix
Table 3: Distribution of USE BR and PROJECT SCOPE
USE BR PROJECT SCOPE
Freq. % Freq. %
1 54 35.53 55 36.18
2 37 24.34 35 23.03
3 19 12.50 23 15.13
4 42 27.63 39 25.66
Total 152 100.00 152 100.00
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
INDUSTRY E 1
USE BR 2 0.20
PROJECT SCOPE 3 0.25 0.35
STARTUP 4 0.17 -0.04 -0.04
DURATION 5 0.32 0.04 0.09 -0.13
FOUNDATION 6 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.31 0.00
GRANT 7 0.13 0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.02
D 50 8 0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.36 -0.16 0.51 -0.07
D 100 9 -0.18 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 0.09 -0.33
D 1000 10 0.06 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.26 -0.07
D 1000 PLUS 11 0.07 0.04 -0.08 -0.16 0.20 -0.33 0.16 -0.41 -0.11 -0.09
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